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Abstract
Reform opponents often argue that beneficial reforms should be rejected,
just in case implementation leads the polity down the slippery slope (of
implementing additional reforms) that ends at an outcome that is worse
than the status quo. What rationalizes this fear of policy overshoot-
ing its target? In the context of public goods provision, I explain the
slippery slope sentiment as the consequence of manipulation by some
informed voters, of the beliefs of misinformed voters who systematically
undervalue the public good. Inefficiently under-providing the public
good reduces the opportunities for the misinformed to learn the true
value of the good, which suppresses aggregate demand for the good.
This incentive to distort is larger when the income of the pivotal voter
is further from the median income, and exists even when the number of
misinformed are small. Using an inequality measure that is analogous
to, but distinct from, Lorenz dominance, I show that slippery slope
inefficiencies are more likely to arise when inequality increases.
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1 Introduction
Once we let go of the exclusivity of a one man-one woman rela-
tionship with procreation linking the generations, then why stop
there? If it is `about love and commitment' then it is entirely log-
ical to extend marriage to, say, two sisters bringing up children
together. If it is merely `about love and commitment' then there is
nothing illogical about multiple relationships, such as two women
and one man.  Lord Carey, former Archbishop of Canterbury
So argued Lord Carey (2013) against same-sex marriage, invoking the fear that
embracing marriage equality would be the first step down the slippery slope
to celebrating incestuous or polyamorous relationships. In an earlier debate,
Justice Antonin Scalia and other conservatives argued against extending many
civil rights and protections to gays and lesbians that were enjoyed by hetero-
sexuals1, on the basis that doing so would be the first step towards legalizing
same-sex marriage  even though there was little popular support for mar-
riage equality at the time. Both cases are examples of arguments against a
proposed policy  not because the policy is itself objectionable, but because
of the objectionable additional reforms that would likely follow due to the
policy's implementation.
Anti-reform arguments of this sort are commonplace in political discourse.
And, although slippery-slope arguments are by their nature `anti-reform', they
are not unique to conservatives. For example, liberals in societies with uni-
versal healthcare often argue against limited privatization initiatives as the
first step along the slippery slope towards dismantling the welfare state. In
Canada, for example, there is much opposition to the evolution of a two-tiered
healthcare system in which people can choose to pay for private alternatives.
1For example, in Lawrence v Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), Justice Scalia wrote in a minor-
ity opinion that gay men ought to not enjoy the right to engage in consensual intercourse in
the privacy of their homes. The opinion argues at 600: That review is readily satisfied here
by the same rational basis...that certain forms of sexual behavior are `immoral and unac-
ceptable,'... This is the same justification that supports many other laws regulating sexual
behavior that make a distinction based upon the identity of the partner-for example, laws
against adultery, fornication, and adult incest, and laws refusing to recognize homosexual
marriage.
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Indeed, until a 2005 Supreme Court decision ruled such laws illegal, six of
Canada's ten provinces had bans on individuals using private insurance to
access services that were generally available through the public system.
Whilst the contexts differ, the arguments share a common feature. Reform
opponents hold that society should reject otherwise beneficial or efficiency-
enhancing policies or reforms, just in case those reforms push society down a
slippery slope that ends in policies that are much worse than the status quo.
The argument is puzzling in at least the following sense: it assumes that re-
forms generate momentum. Once a primary reform that enacts a desirable
policy is implemented, successive reforms will inevitably follow, causing policy
to over-shoot its target. But surely Congress (or the appropriate decision-
making body) must approve those successive reforms as well? Presumably,
Congress may reject further reforms if they are indeed undesirable or ineffi-
cient.
This paper explains the slippery slope sentiment in the context of a polity
where some agents are misinformed about the value of proposed policies or
reforms, but may come to learn of their value through acquaintance. As I
will demonstrate, under majority rule, a partially informed polity will choose
differently from a perfectly informed one  even if a large majority of the
polity are correctly informed. This creates an incentive for agents who dislike
the expected policy outcomes when the polity is perfectly informed (i.e. the
outcome at the end of the slippery slope) to not implement the initial policy
or reform, and thereby prevent learning. In effect, the identity of the future
decision maker (pivotal voter) is endogenous to the current policy choice. The
current decision maker has an incentive to inefficiently maintain the status quo
in order to retain control of the agenda.
That voters learn by acquaintance is plainly evident. History is replete with
examples of policies that voters were originally suspicious or skeptical about,
but eventually came to appreciate. Social Security, which is now extremely
popular amongst voters, was, at its inception, feared by many as a socialist
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scourge that would enslave Americans.2 In a different context, recent work
by Baccini and Leemann (2012) shows that voters are more likely to be sen-
sitive to climate issues when voting after being exposed to a natural disaster.
Social science research suggests a similar effect regarding attitudes towards
gays and lesbians. Herek and Glunt (1993) and Herek et al. (1996) show
that interpersonal contact was the strongest predictor of positive attitudes
towards homosexuals. And, of course, public policy affects the opportunities
for learning by acquaintance to occur. Day and Schoenrade (1997), Day and
Schoenrade (2000), and Griffith and Hebl (2002), amongst others, demonstrate
that individuals are more likely to be open about their sexuality (and thereby
enable known interpersonal contact between homosexuals and heterosexuals)
in environments where anti-discrimination laws and policies are present.3
The idea that voters are often mistaken about the value of reforms or public
goods is also plainly evident. In a survey of 1021 individuals, Koch and Mettler
(2012) found that over 50% of respondents receiving government benefits were
unaware that those benefits were indeed provided by the government.4 This
2A Republican congressman from New York claimed: The lash of the dictator will
be felt, and 25 million free American citizens will for the first time submit themselves
to a fingerprint test. Another opponent worried that it would establish a bureaucracy
in the field of insurance in competition with private business that would destroy private
pensions. Unsurprisingly, slippery slope concerns formed part of the objection to Social
Security. During hearings before the Senate Finance Committee, a senator from Oklahoma
asked Secretary of Labor, Frances Perkins, Isn't this socialism?. When she answered no,
he responded: Isn't this a teeny-weeny bit of socialism? Altman (2005)
3Indeed, as this article is being written, Congress is debating a federal Employment
Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) to protect homosexual and transgendered people from
discrimination in the workplace. That there is considerable opposition to the bill is perfectly
consistent with this paper's thesis that politicians will reject desirable reforms does anyone
genuinely favor arbitrary discrimination in the workplace?  due to slippery slope concerns.
Anti-discrimination protections that allow homosexuals to become more visible may result
in co-workers favorably amending their attitudes towards homosexuals, and by consequence,
supporting social policies that are more inclusive of homosexuals, such as marriage equality.
4In their study, Koch and Mettler first asked respondents if they had ever used a govern-
ment social program or not. Only 43% responded affirmatively. Respondents were then read
a list of 21 government programs, and then asked if their response would change. After hear-
ing the list, 96% of respondents admitted to having benefited from government programs.
The study relied purely upon self reporting. Amongst respondents who originally claimed
to have not benefited from government programs, 60% later admitted to having claimed the
Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 47% had claimed the Earned Income Tax Credit, 44%
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perceived absence of government in their lives suggests that agents will be
more skeptical of the value of public spending than they would ideally, if they
were correctly informed. Conversely, when government spending is seen to
be wasteful or directed towards ends that do not directly improve the public
welfare, voters tend to inflate the cost of such programs. U.S. spending on
foreign aid provides a stark example. In a 2010 World Public Opinion Poll of
848 Americans, the median respondent believed that the foreign aid budget
accounted for 25% of the federal spending, whilst only 19% believed it was
below 5%. The median respondent believed that foreign aid should ideally
comprise 10% of federal spending.5 In fact, the foreign aid budget in 2010
was less than 1% of total federal spending.6 By over-attributing the share
of public spending on `non-beneficial' projects, voters effectively undervalue
public spending as an aggregate bundle. This is especially true if voters under-
estimate the positive externalities associated with foreign aid.
To give context to the analysis, I consider a stylized model that focuses on
the provision of a public good that has an objective marginal benefit, but
which some agents undervalue. I refer to the latter agents as misinformed.
Agents in the economy are distinguished by their income, and the public good
is financed by a proportional tax on income. These assumptions imply that
informed agents with higher incomes will demand lower levels of public goods
provision  even though they value the public good identically to informed
agents with lower incomes  because they are liable to finance a greater share
of the public good. The assumptions also imply that at each income level,
misinformed agents demand less of the public good than their informed coun-
terparts. Combining these results, each misinformed voter can be associated
accessed Social Security, 43% benefited from Pell Grants, 40% were on Medicare, 28% were
on Medicaid, and 25% received Food Stamps.
5The mean responses were even larger - the average respondent believed that foreign aid
comprised 27% of federal spending, but should only be 13%.
6A 2000 poll by the same group found that 61% of respondents believed the foreign aid
budget was too large. (In that survey, the median estimate of the foreign aid budget was
10% of total federal spending.) When asked to imagine that the federal government actually
spent 1% of its budget on foreign aid - which was actually the case - only 13% still claimed
that this amount was too large.
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(in principle) with a wealthier correctly informed voter with the same pref-
erences over public policy. Misinformed agents express preferences as if they
were informed and richer than they actually are. Observing the system from
without, the partially informed polity appears to behave in the same way that
a much richer fully informed polity would. In particular, since misinformed
agents behave as if they are richer than they actually are, the income of the
pivotal voter will be larger than the true median income.
The possibility of learning introduces an additional dynamic. To make things
stark, suppose all misinformed voters perfectly learn the value of the public
good if a positive quantity is provided. Following any period in which there
is positive provision of the public good, all the misinformed voters will learn
the truth, and demand a larger level of the public good in the future. This
changes the identity of the pivotal voter. By choosing his ideal (positive)
level of the public good, the pivotal voter in the partially-informed economy
(whose income will be above the true median income) will cede political power
to the true median income earner, causing future public goods provision to
increase. If this increase is indeed large enough, the old pivotal voter may
prefer to prevent learning by not providing the public good at all. By en-
trenching the inefficient status quo, the pivotal voter can prevent learning by
the misinformed, and accordingly, retain control of the agenda. The decision
maker is willing to tolerate short run inefficiencies to prevent sustained long
run inefficiencies that, from her perspective, are much worse.
Several results are worth mentioning. First, as the examples in sections 4 and
5.1 make clear, the result can hold even when a significant majority of agents
are perfectly informed. (Indeed, if a majority of agents were misinformed, the
results would be trivial.) The key insight of this paper is that in the presence of
political competition, a small (but significant) amount of misinformation can
result in a complete breakdown in the provision of public goods  a result
which is quite stark. The very existence of misinformed voters creates an
incentive for a subset of the informed majority to exploit the misinformed, by
distorting policy in such a way that causes the misinformed to remain as such.
Moreover, the result is not strongly predicated on any interaction between
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income and informedness. In particular, it is not crucial to the analysis that
the poor are more likely to be misinformed than the rich. Certainly, and in
contrast to Frank (2007), I do not suggest that the poor are systematically
duped by the rich to vote against their interests.
As a benchmark, I consider the case where an agent's informedness status is
independent of her income. Relative to this benchmark, the inefficient outcome
becomes even more likely7 if, holding constant the total number of informed
and misinformed agents, the misinformed are more likely to be drawn from
the poor. However, I also demonstrate that inefficiencies can arise if only a
small number of below-median income earners are misinformed, but a large
number of slightly above-median income earners are misinformed. (Such a
situation might be plausible with public goods such as social insurance, which
the poor are much more likely to be acquainted with than the middle class.)
This latter case makes clear that the culpability for slippery-slope inefficiencies
need not lie with the misinformed poor  misinformation at other portions of
the income distribution can also cause inefficiencies to arise.
Second, the model exhibits an ends-against-the-middle flavor (see Epple and
Romano (1996)). As will become clear, political competition pits the informed
poor against a coalition of the informed rich and all misinformed agents (in-
cluding the misinformed poor). The stability of this coalition depends upon
the misinformed poor not becoming informed. Indeed  although the misin-
formed all vote the same way, regardless of income  the misinformed poor
tend to work against their interests much more than the misinformed rich.
Since the informed rich have a strategic interest in under-providing the public
good, the misinformed rich may still be acting in their best interests in de-
manding less of the public good  even if only unwittingly. By contrast, the
misinformed poor really would regret their choice, after becoming informed.
Third, in the context of financing public goods, the prevalence of the slippery
slope phenomenon is related to the amount of inequality in the polity. In a
7There is no uncertainty in this model. Throughout this paper, I use terms such as
`likelihood' to refer to the size of the set of parameters for which the outcome is efficient or
not.
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relatively equal society, the cost to the pivotal voter of ceding power is rela-
tively small, since the new pivotal voter will demand only a slightly larger level
of public good in the future. Whilst this is not optimal from the perspective
of the current pivotal voter, it is preferable to the inefficient outcome where
none of the public good is provided. By contrast, if society is very unequal,
then the future median voter may be much poorer, and so demand a much
larger level of public spending than the current pivotal voter is willing to tol-
erate. As such, inefficient under-provision of the public good does not arise
from the learning mechanism alone  but rather through the interaction with
inequality. In this paper, I define a measure of inequality that is analogous
to, but distinct from, Lorenz dominance. I show that under this measure, the
slippery-slope motivated incentive to under-provide public goods (to prevent
learning) is increasing in the amount of inequality in the economy.
A notable feature of the model is that it endogenously explains both a status
quo bias towards inefficient policies, as well as the incentive for gradualism
in policy making. The status quo bias arises directly from the incentive to
prevent learning. By contrast, the incentive for gradualism stems from the
understanding that even small changes will  if they cause learning  result
in political power shifting in a favorable way, which will make further reforms
possible. Gradualism is not merely born from a pragmatic notion of `taking
what one can get', given political constraints. As the analysis in section 6
demonstrates, these choices are made with the expectation of a `domino'-like
effect as the identity of the pivotal voter changes.
This paper contributes to, and extends, several strands of the existing po-
litical economy literature. At its core, the inefficiency in this model arises
from the endogenous time inconsistency in the decision makers' preferences,
arising out of the changing identity of the pivotal voter. This feature is
common to many models of inefficiencies in policy making (especially fis-
cal policy), including Persson and Svensson (1989),Roberts (1989), Alesina
and Tabellini (1990), Tabellini and Alesina (1990), Dewatripont and Roland
(1992), Benabou (2000), Battaglini and Coate (2007), Battaglini and Coate
(2008), amongst many others. However, in contrast to many of these mod-
7
els, and similar to Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), Benabou and Ok (2001),
the shifting political power is not exogenous, but endogenous to the current
agent's policy choice. Interestingly, and in strong contrast to this paper, the
redistribution technology in Benabou and Ok (2001) causes the pivotal agent
to be relatively richer in the future when redistribution is provided - causing a
similar disincentive to favor redistributive policies, when there is policy sticki-
ness. Indeed, policy momentum is another feature of this model that is present
in Benabou and Ok (2001). (In that paper, it is the fear by the current poor
that the redistributive policy that will make rich in the short run, will persist
long enough to eventually expropriate their future wealth.) However, policy
inertia is hard-wired into their model. This paper is more standard in that
it allows the polity to change its policy in every period. Reform momentum
arises as an equilibrium phenomenon rather than as a feature of the model
technology. Although the mechanism that generates the behaviors are dis-
tinct, reform momentum in this model results in an incentive for gradualism
in policy making, similar to Dewatripont and Roland (1992).
Several papers investigate the relationship between inequality and the demand
for public goods or redistribution. Standard models (e.g. Romer (1975),
Meltzer and Richard (1981) and Moene and Wallerstein (2001), amongst oth-
ers) show that redistribution and higher public goods provision are more likely
when inequality is high and the income profile is right skewed. As inequality
worsens, the relatively poorer median voter has a greater incentive to expro-
priate the rich. Benabou (2000) presents a model in which redistribution
generates aggregate social gains. In this model, the standard effect (increasing
inequality begetting a greater impetus for redistribution) is present. However,
a separate effect exists, whereby increasing inequality decreases the incentives
for redistribution, since the social gains will not be shared as equitably. This
results in a `U-shaped' effect where increasing inequality first reduces the like-
lihood of redistribution, and then increases it. In my model, an increase in
inequality uniformly decreases the likelihood of public goods provision, which
puts it in stark contrast to the existing literature.
Finally, this paper extends upon a growing literature concerning learning in a
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political economy context. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) consider a model in
which asymmetric information about the identity of winners and losers from a
reform may cause the reform to fail, even if the reform makes the average agent
better off. Similar to this paper, although using a different mechanism, that
paper finds an endogenous bias towards status quo policies. A more recent
set of papers consider the incentives for agents to choose policies that affect
the learning of others. Strulovici (2010) studies learning in bandit problems
when decisions (about how to experiment) are made collectively by majority
vote. Baker and Mezzetti (2012), Fox and Vanberg (2011) and Parameswaran
(2013), consider models of the judiciary in which learning occurs after courts
observe the outcomes of agent choices. For example, in Parameswaran (2013),
and Fox and Vanberg (2011), agents have an incentive to skew their choices
(or to make choices that appear sub-optimal when dynamic considerations are
ignored) to prevent learning by the court, and consequently affect the way that
legal rules evolve.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In section 2 I introduce
the formal model. Section 3 characterizes the optimal stage game policies in
the absence of any dynamic considerations, and formalizes the notion of ef-
fective income. Section 4 characterizes the Markovian equilibrium in a game
with the simple learning technology described above. Section 5 analyzes the
comparative static effects of varying inequality and informedness, on equilib-
rium public goods provision. Section 6 provides several extensions, including
a demonstration that the results in section 4 are robust to general learning
technologies. All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
2 Baseline Model
There are a continuum of voters with mass 1. Each voter i ∈ [0, 1] has income
yi drawn from a distribution F (y) with support Y ⊂ <+ (possibly finite). The
mean and median incomes are y (F ) (assumed finite) and ym (F ), respectively.
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There is a public good g which gives utility Agα with A > 0 and 0 < α < 1.8
The public good costs p. The government can finance spending on public goods
by levying a uniform linear tax on income τ .9 To focus on the implications of
mistakes and learning, I abstract from the distortionary effects of taxation by
considering a pure endowment economy.
Voters can either be informed (I) or misinformed (M). An informed voter
knows the true value of A, whilst misinformed voters believe A = 0. Let
γ (y, F ) denote the conditional probability that an agent with income y is
informed. Since there are a continuum of voters, this is also represents the
proportion of informed voters at each income level. Denote by γ (F ) =∫
Y
γ (y) dF (y), the number of informed voters in the polity. In everything
that follows, I assume that γ > 1
2
.10
A voter's type θ = (y, t) indicates her income level and state of informedness.
Let Θ = Y × {I,M} be the set of possible voter types. The distribution of
types is given by:
Pr [Y ≤ y, t = I] =
∫ y
0
γ (x) dF (x)
Pr [Y ≤ y, t = M ] = F (y)−
∫ y
0
γ (x) dF (x)
There is a technology through which misinformed agents become informed. Let
Q (·, ·) denote this technology, where γ′ = Q (g, γ) denotes the future profile
of informedness as a function of the current profile and the current level of
8The functional form choice is simply for tractability. The results generalize to any
increasing, concave function that is bounded from below.
9Again, proportional taxation is purely for simplicity. More generally, let T (y, g) be a
feasible tax schedule, representing the amount of taxes paid by an agent with income y, if the
government provides g units of the public good. Feasibility implies
∫
Y
T (y, g) dF (y) = pg.
The results generalize to the case where ∂
2T
∂g∂y > 0  i.e. the marginal rate of taxation is
increasing in the level of public goods, at every level of income. (Since the marginal cost
of public goods provision is ∂T∂g , this condition implies that the marginal cost is rising with
income.) The condition admits certain classes of regressive income tax schedules.
10The case of γ < 12 is trivial. The misinformed are a majority and have identical
preferences that are maximized when g = 0. Hence, the public good is never provided.
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public goods provision.11 In the baseline model, I consider a special case of
this technology in which all agents learn the true value of the public good
whenever a positive quantity is provided. I.e.
Q (γ, g) =
γ g = 01 g > 0
where 1 ∈ Γ is the informedness profile in which γ (y) = 1 for all y. In section
6, I consider a more general class of learning technologies and show that the
baseline results are robust to these alternative technologies.
The income distribution is common knowledge. I assume that the informed-
ness profile and learning technology are known by the informed agents  i.e.
the informed are aware that some agents are misinformed. By contrast, I as-
sume that the misinformed are ignorant of their misinformedness and of the
possibility that learning might take place. Since the dynamics of the model
arise only through learning, this implies that the misinformed will support the
policy that maximizes their stage utility.
There are two political parties who are purely office motivated.12 In every
period, each party announces a feasible fiscal policy (τ, g) that it is committed
to implement if it is elected. All agents vote, and the party receiving a majority
of the vote is elected. All agents discount the future at the common rate
δ ∈ [0, 1).
3 The Stage Game
This section is in two parts. In the first part, I characterize the optimal stage-
policy for each type of agent. As will become apparent, the game is dynamic
11To make stark the mechanism at play in this model, I assume that learning is only
possible through acquaintance with the public good. Of course, other channels exist in the
real world  although they would presumably not provide an incentive to skew the provision
of public goods, which is the focus of this paper's inquiry.
12The results are robust to endowing parties with partial policy motivation, as long as
some office motivation remains.
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only insofar as current policy choices may change the identity of future decision
makers. Hence, the optimal policy in any sub-game where the preferences of
future decision makers is no longer subject to change will correspond to the
optimal stage-game policy. In particular, this will be the case when all agents
are informed (γ = 1) so that no further learning is possible.
3.1 Ideal Policies
Consider type θ = (y, t) agent. Her ideal stage policy is given by:
max
g≥0
(
1− pg
y
)
yi + Atg
α
where pg = τy represents the government's budget constraint. It is easily
verified that agents' preferences are single-peaked in g. The optimal amount
of public spending for a type-(y, t) agent is:
g (y, t) =
(
Atα
p
y
y
) 1
1−α
Obviously, for every y, g (y,M) = 0, and for y′ > y, 0 < g (y′, I) < g (y, I).
Hence, misinformed agents will never provide the public good (and, hence, will
always choose a zero tax rate). Informed agents will choose positive taxation
and spending, although lower income earners prefer more of each than higher
income earners.
The indirect-utility of a type-(y′, t′) agent, when a type-(y, t) agent's optimal
policy is implemented, is:
u(y′,t′) (g (y, t)) = y
′ +
(
At′ − αAty
′
y
)(
αAt
p
y
y
) α
1−α
In particular, the pivotal agent herself receives utility:
u(y,t) (g (y, t)) = y + (1− α)At
(
αAt
p
y
y
) α
1−α
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Although they may differ about the ideal level of provision, all informed voters
agree that this ideal level is strictly positive. Along the Pareto frontier, a
positive quantity of the public good will always be provided. In this sense,
providing none of the public good very clearly entails an inefficient under-
provision.
3.2 Effective Incomes and the Effective Median
In the previous subsection, I showed that stage preferences are single peaked
and that the ideal policies of informed agents are monotonic in their incomes.
Then, if all agents were informed, the median income earner would be pivotal.
However, this monotonicity no longer holds when some agents are misinformed,
as all misinformed agents, regardless of income, demand none of the public
good. More generally, with misinformed voters, the type-space of voters is
multidimensional  voters are distinguished by both their income and their
informedness status. Indeed, with multidimensionality of this sort, the notion
of a `median' voter is, in general, not well defined.
However, as I show below, the effect of misinformedness is for agents to express
preferences that are identical to the preferences that would be asserted by a
richer, correctly informed agent. To see this, consider an agent with income
y and who values the public good at At ≥ 0. (To show the generality of this
approach, I allow the agent to be misinformed in any way, so I do not yet
require that AM = 0.) For any level of public goods provision, g, the agent's
utility is:
u(y,t) (g) =
(
1− pg
y
)
y + Atg
α =
At
A
[(
1− pg
y
)
A
At
y + Agα
]
which represents the same preference as a correctly informed agent with income
x (y, t) = A
At
y. I refer to x (y, t) as the agent's `effective income'. It is the
income level at which a correctly informed agent would evaluate policies in
the same way as the agent in question. In the simple model, where agents
are either correctly informed, or believe the public good is worthless, effective
13
income is given by:
x (y, t) =
y t = I∞ t = M
Naturally, the effective income of a correctly informed agent is simply their
actual income, whilst the effective income of a misinformed agent is infinite.13
The notion of effective income reduces the type-space from two-dimensions (en-
coding income y and the valuation of public goods At) into a single-dimension.
Effective income is a summary statistic for agent preferences. Since, by as-
sumption, misinformed agents systematically undervalue public goods, the ef-
fective income profile of the polity appears richer than the true income profile.
Following the analysis in the previous subsection, agents' ideal stage-policies
are monotonic in their effective income.14 Hence, when voters are ordered ac-
cording to their effective income, standard median voter results (Black (1948),
Downs (1957) etc.) apply.
Let xm (γ, F ) denote the median effective income, given income profile F and
informedness profile γ. The effective median income is15:
xm (γ, F ) =
infz∈Y
∫ z
0
γ (y) dF (y) ≥ 1
2
γ > 1
2
∞ γ < 1
2
Since misinformed agents upwardly skew the effective income distribution, the
effective median income will be (weakly) larger than the true median income.
Indeed, for any γ ∈ Γ, xm (γ, F ) ≥ ym (F ). Misinformedness causes the ef-
fective median voter to be richer than the true median and  since the ideal
level of public goods provision is monotonically decreasing in effective income
 causes the polity to choose a lower level of public goods provision than
13Infinite effective income is an immediate consequence of the assumption that AM = 0.
In section 6, I discuss consider approaches to relaxing this assumption.
14Indeed, g (y, t) =
(
Atα
p
y
y
) 1
1−α
=
(
Aα
p
y
x(y,t)
) 1
1−α
= g (x (y, t) , I) - which is monotoni-
cally decreasing in x.
15If F is continuous, then the top expression simplifies to
∫ xm(γ,F )
0
γ (y) dF (y) = 12 .
14
would be implied by the income profile alone. En masse, the electorate ap-
pears to be more `fiscally conservative' than one would infer from the income
distribution alone.16
4 Model with Simple Learning Technology
In this section, I characterize the dynamic equilibrium with the simple learning
technology. I solve for a Markov perfect equilibrium. Let Vθ (γ) be the value
function for a type θ voter, given an informedness profile γ. If γ = 1, then
the true median is pivotal in the current period and all future periods. (This
follows since the current policy does not affect the continuation game, and so
agents' lifetime preferences over policy are simply given by their stage prefer-
ences  and these are single-peaked.) Then, the optimal policy is simply the
one that maximizes the median agent's stage preferences, and so:17
g∗ (1) = arg max
g
{(
1− pg
y
)
ym + Ag
α + δV(ym,1) (1)
}
= g (ym, I) =
(
Aα
p
y
ym
) 1
1−α
Since the state never changes, for any type (y, t), the value function is given
by:
V(y,t) (1) =
1
1− δ
[
y +
(
At − αA y
ym
)(
αA
p
y
ym
) α
1−α
]
16Note again that this result would remain true even if I relaxed the assumption that
the misinformed believe that the public good is worthless (i.e. AM = 0). Indeed, along as
AM < A, the results that: (i) the effective median was richer than the true median (making
the electorate appear richer than it truly is) and (ii) the polity consequently chooses a lower
level of public goods provision, continue to hold.
17Without confusion, I use g∗ (γ) to denote the level of public goods chosen in equilibrium
when the informedness profile is γ, and g (y, t) to denote the level of public goods that
maximizes a (y, t)-type agent's stage preferences.
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Now, take any γ 6= 1. An informed agent's utility from having g units of the
public good provided is:
v (g; γ) =

(
1− pg
y
)
y + Atg
α + δV(y,I) (1) if g > 0
y + δV(y,I) (γ) if g = 0
(1)
It follows that if g∗ (γ) = 0, then V(y,I) (γ) = 11−δy.
Unlike in the stage game, in the dynamic setting where learning is possible,
preferences need no longer be single-peaked over the entire policy space. As (1)
makes clear, continuation payoffs are constant for any g > 0, and so over this
region, lifetime preferences are single-peaked, since stage preferences are single-
peaked. However, continuation payoffs are discontinuous at g = 0. Moreover,
the continuation payoff from choosing g = 0 may either be higher or lower than
the continuation payoff from g > 0, depending on the agent's income. For an
agent with income y > 1
α
ym, it can be verified that:
1
1−δy > V(y,I) (1). For
such agents, the median income earner's ideal policy is so far from their own
ideal, that receiving none of the public good forever is preferable to receiving
the median income earner's ideal level forever. For these agents, although
lifetime utility falls as g decreases from their ideal level to 0, it jumps up
discontinuously at g = 0. By contrast, for agents with y < 1
α
ym, lifetime utility
is falling as g decreases to 0 and drops down discontinuously at g = 0, which
preserves single-peakedness. Although preferences are no longer single-peaked
for all agents in the dynamic setting, the following Lemma demonstrates that
the effective median voter is still pivotal:
Lemma 1. Let xm (γ, F ) be the effective median voter given informedness
profile γ. The following are true:
1. Suppose u(xm(γ,F ),I) (g = 0) > u(xm(γ,F ),I) (g (xm (γ, F ) , I)). Then for all
x > xm (γ, F ), u(x,I) (g = 0) > u(x,I) (g (xm (γ, F ) , I));
2. Suppose u(xm(γ,F ),I) (g = 0) < u(xm(γ,F ),I) (g (xm (γ, F ) , I)). Then for all
x < xm (γ, F ), u(x,I) (g = 0) < u(x,I) (g (xm (γ, F ) , I)).
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Lemma 1 shows that, if the effective median income earner prefers to not
provide the public good, then so will all agents whose effective income is larger
(i.e. agents whose income is actually higher, or misinformed agents). By
contrast, if the effective median prefers to provide her ideal stage-game level of
the public good, then so will all informed agents with lower income. Hence, the
governing coalition will either consist of the `informed poor' or the `rich' and
misinformed (where `rich' and `poor' indicate incomes relative to the effective
median).
The effective median faces a trade-off between choosing her ideal policy today
and giving up future political power on the one hand, and retaining political
power by not providing the public good at all. Whilst retaining political
power is costly in that it requires an under provision of the public good, it may
outweigh the detriment of ceding political power and facing a much larger over-
provision of the public good in the future. This will be true if the difference in
income levels (and hence, difference in ideal levels of public goods provision)
between the true median and effective median is large enough.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique κ (α, δ) > 1
α
s.t. the equilibrium level
of public goods provision is:
g∗ (γ) =
g∗ (xm (γ) , I)
xm(γ)
ym
< κ
0 xm(γ)
ym
> κ
Moreover, κ (α, δ) satisfies: (1− δ) (1− α)+δ (1− ακ) (κ) α1−α = 0, and ∂κ
∂α
< 0
and ∂κ
∂δ
< 0.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that the equilibrium level of public goods provision
can be in one of two regimes. If the effective median income is not too much
larger than the true median income, then the public good will be provided
in positive quantities in every period. Since the true median will demand a
level of public goods provision only slightly higher than the effective median's
ideal  the effective median voter finds it preferable to implement her ideal
policy today and tolerate a slightly larger provision of public goods in every
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future period, rather than retain political power by never providing the public
good. By contrast, if the true and effective median incomes differ by a large
amount, then public goods provision breaks down altogether. The effective
median would rather not provide the public good at all, than receive her
desired amount today, and be subject to a sustained over-provision in the
future. The current decision maker chooses to implement an inefficient policy
today for fear that implementing the stage-game efficient policy will lead her
down the slippery slope to policies that are even worse (from her perspective).
Given the above discussion, Proposition 1 effectively divides the parameter-
space into two regions  an `Efficient Provision' region and a `Slippery-Slope
Inefficiency' region. In the `Efficient Provision' region, positive quantities of
the public good are provided. These policies are efficient in the sense that they
correspond to the ideal stage policies of some voter, and hence lie on the Pareto
Frontier. By contrast, in the `Slippery Slope' region, the public good is not
provided at all, which is clearly inefficient, since every informed agent would
ideally choose a positive level of public goods provision. It is worth noting
that efficient provision need not be efficient in the sense of Samuelson (1954).
The efficient (Samuelson) level of the public good is g∗ =
(
αA
p
) 1
1−α
 the
level at which the aggregate marginal benefit αAgα−1 and the marginal cost p
coincide. In standard models, where the median income earner is pivotal and
the income distribution is right-skewed, the equilibrium level of public goods
provision, g (ym, I) =
(
αA
p
y
ym
) 1
1−α
, will exceed this level. Since the median
voter is liable for less than the true marginal cost of providing the public
good, the public good will be over-provided in the sense of Samuelson. In this
model, since the effective income of the pivotal voter is larger than the median
income, the equilibrium (short-run) level of public spending may be closer to
the Samuelson level. Indeed, these will coincide if the effective median income
coincides with the average income in the economy. Of course, if the effective
median income is larger still, there will be an under-provision of the public
good relative to the Samuelson level. Moreover, this effect only exists in the
short run. In the long run, as learning takes place, and the pivotal voter
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converges to the median income earner, public spending will converge to the
higher-than-efficient level. This suggests a limited basis for a small amount of
misinformation to be desirable, in order to better align the costs faced by the
pivotal voter to aggregate social costs.
I end this section by considering a simple example in which informedness is
constant and independent of income. This is a `judgment free' baseline of
sorts  it does not appeal to any informedness differential between agents at
different levels of the income spectrum. In particular, I do not assume that
the poor are more or less likely to be informed than the rich. (In section
5.2, I analyze how the equilibrium level of public goods provision may vary
with different informedness profiles.) I assume that income is log-normally
distributed, since this has been shown to be a reasonable approximation of the
income profiles in many countries. I calibrate the income distribution to the
U.S. economy, using the Gini Coefficient as a measure of inequality.
Example 1. Suppose lnY ∼ N (ln ym, σ2) and γ (y) = γ > 12 is con-
stant. The effective median income is given by
∫ xm
0
γdF (y) = 1
2
, where
F (y) = Φ
(
1
σ
ln
(
y
ym
))
is the distribution function. This implies that xm =
F−1
(
1
2γ
)
= yme
σΦ−1( 12γ ) ≥ ym. By Proposition 1, the public good will not
be provided if xm
ym
> κ. This implies eσΦ
−1( 12γ ) > κ which will be true if
γ < 1
2Φ[ 1σ lnκ]
= γ˜. Hence, there is a threshold level of informedness below
which the public good will not be provided.
To get a sense of how much misinformation is required, suppose σ = 0.886 and
δ = 0.95. The former is calibrated to the Gini coefficient measure of inequality
in the U.S. in 201018 using the property that the Gini coefficient for log-normal
income profiles is 2Φ
(
σ√
2
)
− 1. In the table below, I report the threshold
value κ, for several different parametric values of α (which parametrizes the
value of public spending), given the assumed value of δ. As predicted above,
the threshold value κ is decreasing in α. The table below also reports the
associated threshold informedness levels.
18According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the Gini Coefficient for the United States was
0.469 in 2010. United States Census Bureau (2012)
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α 0.25 0.50 0.75
κ 4.0987 2.0260 1.3406
γ˜ 0.5295 0.6351 0.7941
Example 1 demonstrates that misinformation about the value of public spend-
ing that is spread broadly throughout the population, can be sufficient to
generate a complete breakdown in its provision. The result does not hinge on
the relationship between income and inequality. Importantly, it is not crucial
to the analysis that the poor are less informed than the rich. Moreover, a
relatively small amount of misinformation may suffice to stifle provision of the
public good. In the above example, when α = 0.75, public goods provision
ceases entirely if the effective median income is more than 34% above the true
median income. This implies that a misinformedness rate of 21% is sufficient
to induce slippery slope inefficiencies, even if the remaining 79% of voters are
correctly informed and would ideally demand positive provision of the public
good. In example 3, in the following section, I compare this result to the
outcome in cases when information is not income independent.
5 Comparative Statics
In this section, I examine the comparative statics of changes in the income
and informedness profiles on the equilibrium level of public goods provision.
5.1 Inequality and the Slippery Slope
The main result from the previous section is that inefficiencies arise when the
effective and true median incomes are sufficiently disparate. Of course, as was
shown in section 3, this difference in incomes is endogenous to the model, and
is as a function of both the true income distribution and the informedness
profile. In the introduction to this paper, I noted that many previous papers
predict relationships between inequality and public goods provision  that
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these are positively related according to standard models, and `U-shaped' in
Benabou (2000). In this section, I demonstrate that for an appropriately
defined measure of inequality, an increase in inequality will be associated with
a larger separation between effective and true median incomes  and, as such,
with a greater likelihood of a slippery-slope motivated under-provision of the
public good.
Since our question concerns the effect of inequality on public goods provision,
the comparative static analysis ideally considers the effect of a change in the
income distribution, keeping the informedness profile fixed. However, in sec-
tion 2, the informedness profile was defined conditionally upon the income
distribution. Hence, as the income distribution changes, we must take care to
appropriately modify the informedness profile as well. (To see why, suppose
that γ was kept unchanged, which is equivalent to assuming that it is inde-
pendent of the income distribution. Then a change in the income profile will
generically change the number of agents associated with each income level,
and this will affect the aggregate informedness level.) To do so, I assume that
the informedness profile is income-rank independent. Let Y ⊂ <+ be a convex
set, and let FY denote the set of continuous distribution functions on Y .
Definition 1. An informedness profile γ (·|·) is income-rank independent if
for any F1, F2 ∈ FY , and for any quantile p ∈ (0, 1), γ
(
F−1
1
(p) |F1
)
=
γ
(
F−12 (p) |F2
)
.
Income-rank independence essentially says that the likelihood that an agent is
informed depends only upon his rank in the income distribution (as measured
by the quantile into which his income falls), and not the income level itself.
This property ensures that the informedness of agents remains unchanged,
even as their incomes are perturbed.
Proposition 2. Let F1, F2 ∈ FY and let the informedness profile γ (·|·)
be income-rank independent. Then
xm(γ,F1)
ym(F1)
≤ xm(γ,F2)
ym(F2)
if and only if
F1 (xm (γ, F1)) ≥ F2
(
xm (γ, F1)
ym(F2)
ym(F1)
)
.
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Proposition 2 provides a sufficient condition on the distribution functions for
the deviation between effective and true median incomes to diverge. To get
the intuition, consider the case where ym (F1) = ym (F2), so that the median
incomes coincide under both income profiles. With income-rank independence,
the median effective income must occupy the same income quantile regardless
of the actual income distribution. It is sufficient to check whether the effective
median income under the first income profile xm (γ, F1) is associated with a
higher or lower quantile under the second income profile. In the latter case,
the new effective median income xm (γ, F2) must be larger, since income level
xm (γ, F1) occupies a quantile that is too low under income profile F2. When
the medians differ, it suffices to simply scale income under profile F2 up or
down in a proportional manner such that the medians do coincide. Combined
with Proposition 1, Proposition 2 addresses the relationship between different
income profiles and the likelihood of slippery-slope inefficiencies.
Of course, Proposition 2 does not directly address the relationship between
slippery slope incentives and inequality. To do so, I introduce a notion of
inequality that is analogous to, but distinct from, Lorenz dominance. I say
that Y1 is more equal than Y2 if Y2 is a median-normalized spread of Y1.
Definition 2. Let Y1 and Y2 be random variables, and for each i ∈ {1, 2}, let
Fi (y) and ym (Fi) be the associated distribution function and median, respec-
tively. Y2 is a median-normalized spread of Y1, if F2 (zym (F2)) ≥ F1 (zym (F1))
whenever z < 1 and F2 (zym (F2)) ≤ F1 (zym (F1)) whenever z > 1.
The notion of a median-normalized spread is intimately related to that of a
median-preserving spread19. Indeed, Y2 is a median-normalized spread of Y1 if
and only if Y2
ym(F2)
is a median-preserving spread of Y1
ym(F1)
. Two properties of
median-normalized spreads recommend its use as an income inequality rank-
ing. First, if Y1 and Y2 share a common median, then median-normalized
spreads and median-preserving spreads are equivalent concepts. There is a
19Formally F2 is a median preserving spread of F1, if F1 and F2 share a common median,
ym (i.e. F1 (ym) =
1
2 = F2 (ym)), and if F2 (y) ≥ F1 (y) whenever y < ym and F2 (y) ≤ F1 (y)
whenever y > ym. See Mendelson (1987) and Malamud and Trojani (2009).
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clear sense in which the notion of a median-preserving spread provides a (par-
tial) inequality ranking of income distributions. Although in both cases the
median agent receives the same income, more agents under F2 receive incomes
that are distant from the median than under F1. Income under F2 is less
concentrated around the median income.
Second, normalizing by the median income ensures that the inequality rank-
ing is invariant to arbitrary scaling. A failure of scale invariance would, for
example, cause the measure of inequality to potentially vary depending on
which unit of currency is used to measure income. Naturally, scale invariance
is a property shared by many other measures of inequality, including Lorenz
functions20, and their associated measures, such as the Gini coefficient. Im-
portantly for the analysis, scale invariance allows for a comparison of income
distributions across economies with different median incomes.
Finally, there is a noteworthy analogy between median-normalized spreads
and Lorenz dominance as measures of inequality. As Atkinson (1970), This-
tle (1989) and the proof of Lemma 3 indicate, Y1 is more equal that Y2 in
the sense of Lorenz dominance if and only if 1
E[Y2]
Y2 is a mean-preserving
spread of 1
E[Y1]
Y1. Lorenz dominance requires that, after normalizing the in-
come distributions to ensure that the means are equal, one distribution is a
mean-preserving spread of the other. By contrast, the measure of inequality
used in this paper requires that, after normalizing the income distributions to
ensure that medians are equal, one distribution is a median-preserving spread
of the other. The similarity between the approaches is obvious.
Lemma 2. Let F1, F2 ∈ FY and let γ (·|·) be any income-rank independent
informedness profile. Suppose F2 is more unequal than F1 in the sense of
median-normalized spreads. Then
xm(γ,F1)
ym
≤ xm(γ,F2)
ym
.
Lemma 2 demonstrates the relationship between inequality and the dispersion
between the effective and true median incomes. Suppose income profile Y2 is
20Given an income distribution F , the Lorenz function L (p) = 1y
∫ F−1(p)
0
ydF (y) mea-
sures the fraction of total income held by the lowest p percent of income earners. Income
distribution F1 Lorenz dominates F2 if L1 (p) ≥ L2 (p) for every p ∈ [0, 1].
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more unequal than Y1 in the sense of median-normalized spreads. Then the
distance between the true and effective median incomes will be larger under F2
than F1. Combined with Proposition 1, this implies that the likelihood that
the equilibrium will be in the slippery slope regime, and that public goods
provision will break down altogether, is larger in the more unequal society.
This is a stark result. In contrast to standard results, an increase in inequality
may be associated with a significant decrease in public goods provision. As
inequality worsens, the incomes of the pivotal voter and the median income
earner diverge, and consequently, the current pivotal voter will be more wary
of ceding political power.
Note that the sense in which public goods provision is less likely is that the
economy is more likely to be in the slippery slope regime. However, if the
equilibrium remains in the efficient provision regime after inequality worsens,
then the level of public goods provision may actually go up. Although the
decision to provide public goods or not depends upon the ratio of the effective
and true median incomes, conditional upon positive provision, the quantity
provided depends on the ratio between the effective median and average in-
comes. By construction, the medians of median-normalized spreads coincide
(after normalization). Nevertheless, if average income is much larger under
profile F2, then the pivotal voter may indeed demand a larger quantity of the
public good. Intuitively, this will be the case if y(F2)
y(F1)
≥ xm(γ,F2)
xm(γ,F1)
.
Of course, median-normalized spreads is just one approach to measuring in-
come inequality. I have already argued that there is a strong analogy be-
tween median-normalized spreads and Lorenz dominance (which is related to
mean-preserving spreads). Under certain conditions, it can be shown that
median-normalized spreads imply Lorenz dominance.
Lemma 3. Let F1, F2 ∈ FY and suppose F2 is a median-normalized spread
of F1. Furthermore, suppose
y¯(F2)
ym(F2)
≥ y¯(F1)
ym(F1)
and suppose there is a unique z
at which the functions F1 (y¯ (F1) z) and F2 (y¯ (F2) z) cross. Then F1 Lorenz
dominates F2.
Lemma 3 shows that, if two additional conditions are met, an increase in
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inequality in the sense of median-normalized spreads implies an increase in
inequality in the sense of Lorenz dominance. The first condition requires
that higher inequality causes the median and mean incomes to diverge, which
implies that increasing inequality skews income towards the rich. The second
condition is a single crossing property on distribution functions of the mean-
normalized income profiles. In general, median-normalized spreads are, by
themselves, not sufficient to guarantee that these two conditions hold, and
hence are not generically sufficient for Lorenz dominance.21 However, the
following corollary provides a sufficient condition for a median-normalizing
spread to be sufficient for Lorenz dominance.
Corollary 1. Let F1, F2 ∈ FY and suppose F2 is a median-normalized spread
of F1 satisfying
y¯(F2)
ym(F2)
= y¯(F1)
ym(F1)
. Then F1 Lorenz dominates F2.
Although the additional sufficient conditions make the results in Lemma 3 and
Corollary 1 quite specialized, they are satisfied whenever a median-normalized
spread exists within several classes of commonly used distributions. For ex-
ample, suppose Y1 and Y2 are log-normal income profiles, and that Y2 is a
median-normalized spread of Y1. (This will be true if σ2 ≥ σ1, regardless
of the median incomes in each profile.) Then both additional conditions in
Lemma 3 are immediately satisfied, and so Y1 Lorenz dominates Y2. The same
result holds for income profiles that are both drawn from the Pareto, Weibull
and Uniform families of distributions - all of which are commonly used in
modeling the distribution of income in society.22 In fact, for income profiles
21To see that median-normalized spreads do not imply Lorenz dominance, consider the
following discrete income distributions: Y1 ∈
{
1
2 , 1,
3
2
}
each with probability 13 , and Y2 ∈{
2
5 , 1,
8
5
}
with probabilities 13 ,
1
5 and
7
15 , respectively. Clearly Y2 is a median-normalized
spread of Y1  indeed, it is a median-preserving spread. Furthermore y¯ (F2) =
91
75 >
1 = y¯ (F1) and so the first sufficient condition is satisfied. However, it is easily verified
that F1 (y¯ (F1) · z) and F2 (y¯ (F2) · z) do not satisfy single-crossing. Indeed, F2 (y¯ (F2) · z) ≥
F1 (y¯ (F1) · z) for z ≤ 1 and for z ≥ 12091 . Consistent with Lemma 3, we can show that Lorenz
functions are given by L1 =

1
2p p <
1
3
p− 16 13 ≤ p < 23
3
2p− 12 p ≥ 23
and L2 =

370
999p p <
1
3
25
27p− 185999 13 ≤ p < 815
40
27p− 1327 p ≥ 815
and
these functions do not respect Lorenz dominance, since they intersect at p = 1726 .
22I demonstrate that this is the case for the log-normal distribution. The other cases
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drawn from these four classes of distributions, a median-normalized spread is
necessary and sufficient for Lorenz dominance  the two notions of inequality
are equivalent.
Of course, these results do not generally hold true for arbitrary pairs of distri-
bution functions. As noted above, and in the example in footnote 21, median-
normalized spreads do not generically imply Lorenz dominance. Conversely,
as Example 2, below, demonstrates, Lorenz dominance does not imply that a
median-normalized spread exists. In fact, as the example shows, it is possi-
ble for public goods provision to be more likely (and slippery slope concerns
to be less likely) in an economy that is more unequal in the sense of Lorenz
dominance.
Example 2. Let Y = [0, αy] where α ∈ (1, 2] and consider income distribu-
tions: F1 =
(
y
βy
) 1
β−1
for y ∈ [0, βy] with β ≤ α, and F2 piece-wise defined
with F2 (y) = 1 − 1α for y ∈ [0, αy) and F2 (αy) = 1. (Under F2, the lowest
1 − 1
α
≤ 1
2
fraction of the population earn nothing, whilst the remainder all
earn αy¯. The case of α = β = 2 is especially straight-forward  income is uni-
formly distributed under F1, whereas, under F2, half the population receives
nothing and the other half receives 2y.) Under both profiles the mean income
is y¯. The Lorenz functions are: L1 (p) = p
β and L2 (p) = 0 for p <
α−1
α
and
L2 (p) = αp+ 1−α for p ≥ α−1α . It is easy to verify that F1 Lorenz dominates
F2. However, it is easily verified that F2 is not a median-normalized spread of
F1. Consistent with Lemma 2, the distance between true and effective median
incomes is smaller under F2 even though F2 is more unequal in the sense of
are demonstrated analogously. Let Y1 and Y2 be log-normally distributed  i.e. lnYi ∼
N
(
lnmi, σ
2
i
)
. Then F2 (m2z) = Φ
(
ln z
σ2
)
and F1 (m1z) = Φ
(
ln z
σ1
)
. It is easily verified that
F2 can only be a median-normalized spread of F1 if σ2 ≥ σ1. For each i, y¯(Fi)ym(Fi) = e
1
2σ
2
.
Hence, if F2 is a median-normalized spread of F1 (i.e. if σ2 > σ1), then
y¯(F2)
ym(F2)
> y¯(F1)ym(F1)
and so the first condition is automatically satisfied. Furthermore, for each i, Fi (y¯ (Fi) · z) =
Φ
(
ln z+ 12σ
2
σ
)
. It is easily demonstrated that if F2 is a median-normalized spread of F1,
then F2 (y¯ (F2) · z) > F1 (y¯ (F1) · z) only if z < exp
{
1
2σ1σ2
}
, which verifies that single-
crossing is satisfied. Finally, the Lorenz function associated with a log-normal distribution
is L (p) = Φ
(
Φ−1 (p)− σ). Clearly L1 (p) ≥ L2 (p) for any (and every) p iff σ1 ≤ σ2. Hence,
Y1 Lorenz dominates Y2 if and only if Y2 is a median-normalized spread of Y1.
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Lorenz dominance. Indeed, this result is true even if the informedness pro-
files were different in the two economies. To see why, note that under F2, the
median income is also the maximum income, and so the effective median and
true median share the same income αy¯. Hence, for any informedness profiles
γ1 and γ2,
xm(γ1,F1)
ym(F1)
≥ 1 = xm(γ2,F2)
ym(F2)
. The less equal society (with income profile
F2) will always choose the maximum amount of public goods feasible in any
political equilibrium, whereas the public good may not be provided at all in
the more equal society.
5.2 Nature of Informedness Profile
The previous subsection examined the effect of a changing income profile on
the likelihood of public goods provision. In this subsection, I briefly consider
the effect of different informedness profiles on the provision of public goods.
Remark 1. Let γ1, γ2 ∈ Γ and suppose γ2 ≥ γ1 (i.e. γ2 (y) ≥ γ2 (y) for every
y ∈ Y ). Then xm(γ2,F )
ym(F )
≤ xm(γ1,F )
ym(F )
.
Remark 1 makes the fairly obvious point that a change in the income profile
that (weakly) increases the likelihood that every income earner is informed,
will cause the the effective median agent to have lower income. As the polity
becomes more informed across the board, the proportion of below median
income earners who are informed increases, and so one does not need to travel
as far up the income distribution to find the effective median.
A more interesting question considers the effect of a change in the informedness
profile that reduces the likelihood of being informed at some income levels,
and increases it at others. Recall, in section 4, I introduced Example 1 in
which the informedness profile was constant, and hence independent of income.
I referred to that case as the `judgment-free' baseline as the poor were no
less likely to be misinformed than the rich. In Example 3, below, I consider
two variants of the baseline example, in which the informedness profile is no
longer constant. In both cases, I keep the total number of informed agents
in the economy unchanged. In the first case, I reduce the likelihood that
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below median income earners are informed and increase the likelihood that
above median income earners are informed. In the second case, I increase the
likelihood that below median income earners and very high income earners are
informed, and reduce the likelihood that upper-middle class voters (those
with slightly above median incomes) are informed.
Example 3. Suppose ln y ∼ N (ln ym, σ2) and γ1 (y) =
1 y > ym2γ − 1 y ≤ ym
so that γ1 =γ. Under informedness profile γ1, only below median-income
voters are misinformed. By contrast, let γ2 be as defined below, which again
satisfies γ2 = γ. Under profile γ2, only 2% of below-median income earners are
misinformed, however the next block of middle-income earners are completely
misinformed, whilst the highest income earners are perfectly informed. (One
might interpret this as a case where the public good involves social insurance,
which the current poor are much more likely to be acquainted with than the
middle class.)
γ2 (y) =

0.98 y < ym
0 y ∈ [ym, F−1 (1.49− γ)]
1 y > F−1 (1.49− γ)
It turns out that the effective median income is the same in both cases, and
has income defined by xm (γ) = yme
σΦ−1( 32−γ). There will be slippery-slope
inefficiencies if: κ < eσΦ
−1( 32−γ) which will be true if γ < γ˜ = 3
2
− Φ ( 1
σ
lnκ
)
.
Again calibrating to the U.S. economy, and using the sample values for α from
Example 1, gives the following threshold values:
α 0.25 0.50 0.75
κ 4.0987 2.0260 1.3406
γ˜ 0.5557 0.7127 0.8704
A comparison of the outcomes in Examples 1 and 3 highlights the important
features of the role of the informedness profile in determining the effective
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median (and hence in the likelihood of public goods provision). Relative to
the baseline, both cases in Example 3 involve a transfer of informedness from
either poor or moderately-high income earners, to the super rich. Since the
aggregate level of informedness was unchanged, this necessarily caused the
median effective income to increase. (If more agents with incomes above the
original median effective income are informed, and total informedness is un-
changed, then fewer agents with incomes below the original median effective
income can be informed. But this implies that the new effective median income
must be larger.) Hence, any aggregate-information neutral change in the in-
formedness profile that uniformly increases the informedness level of very high
income earners is likely to cause the median-effective income to increase. Ce-
teris paribus, public goods provision is more likely to break down in economies
where the poor are far less informed than the rich. A poorly informed lower-
class exacerbates slippery-slope concerns, relative to the judgment-free base-
line. This is illustrated in the first case above (with α = 0.75), where the
relative lack of information by the poor causes the public good to not be pro-
vided even if 87% of the population (and 74% of below median income earners)
are correctly informed. By contrast, in the `judgment-free' case, aggregate in-
formedness needed to be below 80% for slippery slope concerns to take effect.
However, as Example 3 also makes clear, significant misinformation amongst
the poor is not crucial to generating slippery slope concerns  culpability
for the breakdown in public goods provision, need not always lie with the
poor. Indeed, concentrating misinformation in the middle of the income dis-
tribution can equally exacerbate problems. The informedness profile interacts
with the income profile in an obvious way to determine the median effective
income. But for two informedness profiles that generate the same median ef-
fective income, the specific details of which agents were likely to be informed
or not is inconsequential to the outcome. As Example 3 demonstrates, it is
unimportant whether misinformation occurs amongst the poorest voters, or
middle-class voters, as long as between these groups, sufficiently many agents
are misinformed. Of course, if every below-median income earner were cor-
rectly informed, then the effective median income would be the true median
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income, and slippery slope concerns could never arise. Hence, misinforma-
tion amongst the poor is important to the analysis. However, it is not crucial
that the poor are more likely to be misinformed than other members of the
community.
6 Extensions
In this section, I consider two variants of the model that extend the results to
more general settings. In the first case, I consider a general learning technol-
ogy, and show that the results from the main section continue to hold. This
extension demonstrates that focusing on the very special learning technology in
the previous sections was without much loss of generality. In the second case,
I discuss the implications of the assumption that misinformed agents do not
value the public good at all, and suggest methods of relaxing this assumption
that preserve the model's results.
6.1 General Learning Technologies and Gradualism
The previous section characterized equilibrium provision of public goods un-
der a simple and stark learning technology. In this section, I show that the
main results continue to hold when more general learning technologies are
considered. In so doing, I show that the above results do not arise out of the
special features of the learning technology  but rather from the very fact of
misinformation and learning.
Consider a simple income distribution, with two income types yH > yL and
F (yL) = φ >
1
2
poor agents.23 The informedness profile is given by the vector
23The two-income-type assumption ensures that there is only one type of agent whose
dynamic choices need to be modeled, since the choices of the uninformed and the informed
poor are stationary. Extending to many income types requires the current dynamic decision
maker to take into account the effect of his current choice on the future choices of other
dynamically sophisticated decision makers with different preferences. This introduces all the
usual time-inconsistency complications into the analysis. Note, however, that the limitation
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γ = (γL, γH) ∈ [0, 1]2. Let Γ =
{
(yL, yH) ∈ ∆|φγL + (1− φ) γH ≥ 12
}
be the
set of informedness profiles where the effective median voter is informed. The
effective median has income:
xm (γ) =
yL φγL > 12yH φγL < 12
Let ΓL =
{
γ ∈ Γ|γL > 12φ
}
be the informedness profiles under which the poor
are pivotal, and let ΓH =
{
γ ∈ Γ|γL ≤ 12φ
}
be the profiles under which the
rich are pivotal. (For technical convenience, I assume that if γL =
1
2φ
, so
that exactly half of voters are informed poor, then the informed rich remain
pivotal.) Note that, conditional upon the effective median being informed, the
income type of the effective median depends only upon γL.
Consider a generalized learning technology Q (g, γ) that is continuous,
(strictly)24 increasing in each argument, and that satisfies Q (0, γ) = γ. These
assumptions imply natural relationships between public goods provision and
learning. The assumption that Q (0, γ) = γ maintains the working assumption
that learning about the public good occurs only through acquaintance. Whilst
this is obviously an over-simplification, it allows the analysis to abstract from
other influencing factors, and focus on the effect of acquaintance-based learn-
ing. Monotonicity implies that more learning occurs when more of the public
good is provided. Furthermore, a more informed polity will remain more in-
formed after receiving the same amount of the public good as a less informed
polity.
Let Θ = {yH , yL}×{I,M} be the set of types, and let (vθ)θ∈Θ be a quadruple
of functions, where vθ : [0, 1]
2 → < denotes the continuation value of a type θ
to two income types does not limit the sense in which the analysis in this section is a
generalization of the analysis in previous sections. Indeed, in those sections  although
more income types were allowed  only two types of decision makers could exert political
power with positive probability; those with the same income as the current pivotal voter,
and those with the same income as the median income earner. Hence, the simplification to
two income types preserves (rather than restricts) the nature of the transition dynamics.
24The monotonicity property is strict whenever Q (g, γ) < 1.
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agent.
Proposition 3. There exists a unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium, and is
jointly characterized by:
1. a set of bounded value functions (v∗θ)θ∈Θwhich satisfy:
v∗(yi,I) (γ) =
(
1− pg
∗ (γ)
y
)
yi + A [g
∗ (γ)]α + δv∗(yi,I) (Q (g
∗ (γ) , γ))
v∗(yi,M) (γ) =
1
1− δ
(
1− pg
∗ (γ)
y
)
yi
2. a policy function:
g∗ (γ) =

(
αA
p
y
yL
) 1
1−α
γ ∈ ΓL
gˆ (γ) γ ∈ ΓH
where
gˆ (γ) = arg max
g≥0
(
1− pg
y
)
yH + Ag
α + δv∗(yH ,I) (Q (g, γ))
Proposition 3 demonstrates that there is a unique Markovian equilibrium of
the generalized learning game, characterized by the above Bellman equations.
As in the previous section, I assume that the misinformed are unaware of
the dynamics arising out of learning. Accordingly they assume the game is
stationary  that continuation play will resemble current policy choices. Since
the poor can never lose political power (ΓL is an absorbing state), they will
choose their ideal policy whenever they are in power. When the rich are in
power, they face a truly dynamic decision problem, and, hence, it is the value
function of the rich that drives the results.
Let κ (α, δ) be the threshold from Proposition 1 in the main section. An
economy is a 5-tuple e = (α, δ, yH , yL, φ) which summarizes the relevant
preference and income distribution parameters. The value function depends
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upon the parameters that constitute the economy, although this dependence
is typically suppressed in the notation. Let E be the set of economies,
EEff =
{
e ∈ E| yH
yL
< κ (α, δ)
}
be the set of economies in which there is pos-
itive public goods provision under the simple learning technology from the
previous section, and let ESS =
{
e ∈ E| yH
yL
> κ (α, δ)
}
be the set of economies
in which there are slippery slope inefficiencies. Consider an economy e with
initial informedness profile γ. Let Gt (γ, e) be the equilibrium public goods
provision at each time t.
As the following proposition shows, slippery slope concerns arise with the
generalized learning technology whenever and only when they arise with the
simple technology:
Proposition 4. Public goods provision respects the following dynamics:
1. If e ∈ EEff , then Gt (γ, e) > 0 for all t and ∃T (γ, e) ≥ 0 s.t. Gt (γ, e) =
g (yL, I) whenever t > T (γ, e).
2. If e ∈ ESS, then Gt (γ, e) −→ 0 as t→∞.
Proposition 4 is the analogue of Proposition 1 in the previous section. It shows
that long run policy in an economy with a general learning technology is iden-
tical to the long run policy with the stark learning technology considered in
the main section. This suggests a strong robustness of the results in sections
4 and 5.1. If the economy lies in the efficient region, then there will be strictly
positive provision of the public good in the short run  although not neces-
sarily at the ideal level of the rich, since the rich may still have an incentive to
under-provide the public (relative even to their own ideal), in order to slow the
process of learning and delay the time at which they completely cede power
to the poor. Since this time will eventually arrive, in the long run, the median
income earner's ideal policy will be eventually implemented. By contrast, if
the economy lies in the slippery slope region, then public goods provision will
very quickly disappear. Again, some public goods provision may occur in the
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short run; the rich may have some `wiggle room' to provide a small amount of
the public good without ceding power.
With additional assumptions, it can be shown the rich will never choose to
provide their ideal level of the public good when in the slippery slope regime.
Even if the rich could choose their ideal level for some periods without ceding
political power, Proposition 4 ensures that they must eventually reduce the
quantity of public goods provided by a significant amount. Intuitively, it
cannot be inter-temporally optimal to expect such a dramatic decrease in
public goods provision. The rich could do better by decreasing the original
level of public goods provision, thereby slowing down the rate of learning, in
order to sustain higher average public goods provision for a longer period of
time. This intuition is formalized in the following Lemma: For notational
convenience , let η (g) =
(
1− pg
y¯
)
yH +Ag
α denote the stage utility of the rich
when g units of the public good are provided, and let Q−1 (y, γ) be the amount
of the public good that is needed to shift the informedness profile from γ to y
.
Lemma 4. Suppose Q is differentiable and η (Q−1 (y, γ)) is concave. Then
Gt (γ, e) < g (yH , I) whenever e ∈ ESS.
The generalized model can explain both a status quo bias in equilibrium policy
making that entrenches inefficiencies, as well as gradualism in policy making
when efficiency enhancing reforms are embraced. The model predicts that the
`reform-motivated-party' (in this case, the party of the poor) will propose a
sequence of policies that eventually result in their base's ideal policy being
implemented  and that they will embrace this gradual approach even if
implementing their ideal policy is feasible in the short term. The virtue of
the gradual approach is not merely the pragmatism of implementing the best
politically feasible outcome. Rather, it sets in motion a `domino-like' sequence
of events that systematically improves the long-run welfare of the party's base.
This effect would be even more pronounced in a more general model with a
generalized learning technology and multiple income types, since then, in every
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period, political power is shifting to agents whose preferences increasingly
aligned with those of the poor.
6.2 Partial Undervaluation of Public Good
The assumption that the misinformed do not value the public good at all is
an admittedly strong assumption. It proved useful in keeping the analysis
tractable by ensuring that all misinformed agents demanded less of the public
goods than all informed agents. Furthermore, it had the feature that the
misinformed would be the natural ally of a rich decision maker who sought to
prevent learning. For generic AM < A, these need not be true. For example,
if AM > 0, then the misinformed would still demand a positive quantity of the
public good, opening up the possibility of a coalition between the informed
poor and the misinformed. (The informed poor have an incentive to form such
a coalition, anticipating that political power will shift in their favor as learning
occurs.)
Nevertheless, the assumption AM = 0 is not crucial generically. Its necessity
stemmed from the interaction of two other strong assumptions of the model 
the strong monotonicity assumption that learning occurs whenever a positive
level of public goods are provided, and the assumption that a positive level of
public goods provision will be stage-game optimal whenever At > 0. It should
be clear that either of these assumptions could be plausibly relaxed in a more
general model. For example, one may plausibly assert that acquaintance-based
learning is improbable (or negligible) if the quantity of public good provided is
so small as to be essentially invisible to the public. Since voters are typically
not monitoring government policy very thoroughly, the policy would need to
be large enough in scale to attract the public's attention and enable them to
appropriately interact with it.
Similarly, we may plausibly assert that agents who place only a small positive
value on the benefit of the public good will demand zero public goods provision.
This would be the case, for example, if the public good could only be provided
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in discrete increments. For example, if public goods provision was limited to
integer quantities, then any agent with effective income x (yi, Ai) >
Ay
p
would
ideally not have the public good provided at all. A similar result arises if the
public good is divisible, but there is a fixed cost C was associated with its
provision, for example the cost of financing the bureaucracy that oversees the
provision the public good. It is easily shown that, under these conditions, an
agent with effective income x (yi, Ai) will optimally demand that the public
good not be provided if:
x (yi, Ai) > (1− α)
(
α
p
)α
A
C
y = x
Either approach allows one to relax the rather strong assumption that the
misinformed completely undervalue the public, without changing the nature
of the strategic interactions involved.
7 Conclusion
Slippery slope concerns are often used in political discourse to argue against
beneficial or efficiency enhancing policies or reforms. Opponents argue that
whilst the policy, taken in isolation, might be beneficial, its implementation
will likely cause a sequence of further policies to be adopted, that results in a
final outcome that is worse than the status quo. What rationalizes this fear
of reform momentum that causes policy to overshoot its target? Why doesn't
the polity simply reject the subsequent reforms, if they really are suboptimal?
This paper rationalizes slippery slope concerns as a consequence of decision
making in a democracy, where some voters are originally misinformed about
the value of a policy or reform, but may come to learn its value through ac-
quaintance. For concreteness, I focused on the provision of a public good that
has an objective marginal benefit, but whose value some voters under-estimate.
Since they are liable to finance a greater share of the public good, richer vot-
ers demand less of the good than the poor. Moreover, at each income level,
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misinformed voters demand less of the good than a correctly informed voter
would. Lower than optimal demand by the misinformed results in political
power being held by agents whose incomes are larger than the true median
income. Through acquaintance with the good, the misinformed come to learn
of its true value. Hence, if the optimal level of the public good is provided,
through time, political power will shift to agents with incomes closer to the
true median, who prefer a larger provision of the public good. This creates
an incentive for the current (relatively rich) decision maker to not provide the
public good, to prevent learning and thereby retain political control of the
agenda.
This paper's main result is that slippery slope inefficiencies are most likely
to arise in polities where the income (or more generally preferences) of the
current and future decision makers are sufficiently disparate. Importantly, I
show that the incentive to distort policy to prevent learning may exist even if
the number of misinformed agents is relatively small and large majorities of
agents are informed. The relationship between income disparity the likelihood
of slippery slope inefficiencies arising suggests a connection to the amount of
income inequality in the polity. I introduce a measure of inequality that is
distinct from, but analogous to, Lorenz dominance, and show that increasing
inequality increases the likelihood that slippery slope inefficiencies will arise.
This result is in contrast to standard models in which rising inequality causes
the demand for public goods to rise. Hence, the analysis suggest a novel
mechanism by which inequality can generate Pareto inefficient outcomes.
I also studied the relationship between the informedness of agents at different
levels of the income profile and slippery slope inefficiencies. Taking the case of
uniform informedness as a `judgment-free' baseline, I demonstrated that slip-
pery slope inefficiencies are more likely to arise when the poor are relatively
less informed than the rich (holding the total number of informed agents con-
stant). This invites the interpretation that the informed rich dupe the less
informed poor into voting against their interests. However, I show that the
same inefficiency can arise if almost all below-median income earners are cor-
rectly informed, but many `middle-class' voters are misinformed. Although the
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misinformed poor contribute to the existence of slippery slope inefficiencies,
culpability for these inefficiencies does not lie solely on their shoulders.
Although the analysis focused on the case of public goods provision, the mech-
anism can be applied more broadly. The motivating example of same-sex
marriage can be mapped into the model by considering the (reasonably) ob-
jective benefits (including favorable tax treatment, legal and societal rights
and recognitions, such as visitation rights at hospitals, etc.) of extending mar-
riage rights to same-sex couples on the one hand, against the personal costs
that individuals may suffer from changing the structure of institutions that
they may be more or less invested in (perhaps for spiritual reasons). In this
context, there is an incentive for conservative voters (for whom the personal
ideological costs are large) to obscure the many legal and financial benefits
that marriage affords same-sex couples, which, if made explicit, would cause
more liberal voters to support same-sex marriage. In this context, the ana-
logue of greater income inequality is greater political polarization, and it is
clear to see that slippery slope inefficiencies will be much more likely to arise
in more polarized societies.
This analysis focused on learning by acquaintance, and thereby abstracted
from the many varied sources of information through which agents may learn
about the value of policies and reforms. The purpose was to demonstrate
that political actors have strong incentives to distort policy choices in order to
prevent learning. In a broader context, one can think of additional resources,
such as the media, that political actors can bring to bear to skew the learning
of voters. Given the proliferation of media sources with the internet and cable
television, the rise of a partisan media, and the increasing tendency of voters to
consciously select their news sources, this suggests fruitful avenues for further
research.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. (1) Take x > xm. Suppose u(xm(γ),I) (g = 0) >
u(xm(γ),I) (g (xm (γ) , I)). Let H (x;xm (γ)) = (1− δ)
(
1− α x
xm(γ)
)
+
δ
(
1− α x
ym
)(
xm(γ)
ym
) α
1−α
. It follows algebraically that u(x,I) (g = 0) >
u(x,I) (g
∗ (xm (γ) , I)) iff H (x;xm (γ1)) < 0. By assumption
H (xm (γ1) ;xm (γ1)) < 0. Moreover:
∂H
∂x
= −(1− δ)α
xm (γ)
− δα
ym
(
xm (γ)
ym
) α
1−α
< 0
Hence, H (x;xm (γ1)) < 0 for all x > xm (γ).
(2) Proved analogously
Proof of Proposition 1 . Since γ > 1
2
, we know that xm (γ) <∞. We know
that a type (y, I) proposer prefers her ideal public good level if H (y, y) > 0
and no public goods otherwise. Let h (k) = H (kym, kym). Since h (k) =
(1− δ) (1− α)+δ (1− αk) (k) α1−α , it is straight-forward to show that, h ( 1
α
)
=
(1− δ) (1− α) > 0 and limk→∞ h (x) < 0. Hence, by the intermediate value
theorem, there exists some κ ∈ ( 1
α
,∞) s.t. h (κ) = 0. Moreover, since ∂h
∂k
=
δ α
1−α (k)
α
1−α−1 (1− k) < 0 whenever k > 1
α
, κ is unique, and h (k) > 0 iff k < κ.
The comparative statics follow by the implicit function theorem:
∂κ
∂α
= −
(1− δ) + δ (κ) 11−α + δ
(1−α)2 (ακ− 1) (κ)
α
1−α ln (κ)
δ α
1−α (κ)
α
1−α−1 (κ− 1) < 0
and
∂κ
∂δ
=
− (1− α) + (1− ακ) (κ) α1−α
δ α
1−α
1
ym
(κ)
α
1−α−1 (κ− 1) < 0
Proof of Proposition 2. For notational simplicity, let xi = xm (γ, Fi) and
let yi = ym (Fi). Let fi (y) = F
′
i (y) be the density of Fi. Consider the
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transformed random variable Yi
yi
, and let Fˆi be its distribution function. Clearly
Fˆi (z) = Pr
[
Yi
yi
≤ z
]
= Fi (yiz). Then fˆi (z) = yifi (yiz).
Let I (x, F ) =
∫ x
0
γ (y|F ) f (y) dy be the number of informed people with
income below x, given income profile F and informedness profile γ. Note
that for any other income profile G, G (y) = F (F−1 (G (y))) and so g (y) =
f (F−1 (G (y))) d
dy
F−1 (G (y)). Hence:
I (x,G) =
∫ x
0
γ (y|G) g (y) dy
=
∫ x
0
γ
(
F−1 (G (y)) |F) f (F−1 (G (y))) d
dy
F−1 (G (y)) dy
=
∫ F−1(G(x))
0
γ (z|F ) f (z) dz
= I
(
F−1 (G (x)) , F
)
where the second line follows from the income-rank independence of γ, and
the third line involves a change of variable. Note also by construction that
I (xm (γ, F ) , F ) =
1
2
.
Using the above property, note that: I (x, Fi) = I
(
Fˆ−1i (Fi (x)) , Fˆi
)
=
I
(
x
yi
, Fˆi
)
and so I
(
xi
yi
, Fˆi
)
= 1
2
. Using the property again, I
(
xi
yi
, Fˆj
)
=
I
(
Fˆ−1i
(
Fˆj
(
xi
xj
))
, Fˆi
)
. Finally, note that I (·, F ) is strictly increasing in its
first argument. Hence x1
y1
≤ x2
y2
iff 1
2
= I
(
x1
y1
, Fˆ1
)
≥ I
(
Fˆ−11
(
Fˆ2
(
x1
y1
))
, Fˆ1
)
=
I
(
x1
y1
, Fˆ2
)
. This will be true iff x1
y1
≥ Fˆ−11
(
Fˆ2
(
x1
y1
))
or equivalentlyFˆ1
(
x1
y1
)
≥
Fˆ2
(
x1
y1
)
. Finally, since Fˆi (z) = F¯i (zyi), we have F1 (x1) ≥ F2
(
x1
y2
y1
)
.
Proof of Lemma 2. Obviously xm(γ|Fi)
ym(F1)
≥ 1. Since F2 is a median-
normalized spread of F1, then F2 (zym (F2)) ≤ F1 (zym (F1)) for z > 1. Taking
z = xm(γ,F1)
ym(F1)
, we have F2
(
xm (γ, F )
ym(F2)
ym(F1)
)
≤ F1 (xm (γ, F1)). A direct appli-
cation of Proposition 2 completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3 . Let Y1 and Y2 be two income profiles. For each profile
Yi, let Fi and Li be the associated distribution and Lorenz functions, and let
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y¯ (Fi) and ym (Fi) be the associated mean and median incomes. Furthermore,
for each i, let Y¯i =
1
y¯(Fi)
Yi and let F¯i and L¯i be the associated distribution and
Lorenz functions. Clearly F¯i (z) = Fi (y¯ (Fi) · z), and y¯
(
F¯i
)
= 1. Furthermore,
by the scale-invariance property of Lorenz functions, L¯i (p) = Li (p).
First, using a variant of the proof in Thistle (1989), I show that Y1 Lorenz dom-
inates Y2 only if F¯2 (y) second order stochastically dominates F¯1 (y). Recall,
the Lorenz function is defined by: L (p) = 1
E[Y ]
∫ F−1(p)
0
ydF (y). Hence:
Li (p) = L¯i (p)
=
∫ F¯−1i (p)
0
ydF¯i (y)
= pF¯−1i (p)−
∫ F¯−1i (p)
0
F¯i (y) dy
where the third line uses integration by parts. Let S¯i (x) =
∫ x
0
F¯i (y) dy.
L1 (p)− L2 (p) = p
[
F¯−11 (p)− F¯−12 (p)
]− (S¯1 (F¯−11 (p))− S¯2 (F¯−12 (p)))
= p
[
F¯−11 (p)− F¯−12 (p)
]− (S¯1 (F¯−11 (p))− S¯1 (F¯−12 (p)))
+
(
S¯2
(
F¯−12 (p)
)− S¯1 (F¯−12 (p)))
=
∫ F¯−12 (p)
F¯−11 (p)
[
F¯1 (y)− p
]
dy +
(
S¯2
(
F¯−12 (p)
)− S¯1 (F¯−12 (p)))
Since F¯2 is a mean-preserving spread of F¯1, the second term (in parentheses) is
non-negative, by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). So is the first term. Suppose
F¯−11 (p) ≤ F¯−12 (p). Then F¯1 (y) − p ≥ 0 for y ∈
[
F¯−11 (p) , F¯
−1
2 (p)
]
. Else,
suppose F¯−11 (p) ≥ F¯−12 (p). Then F¯1 (y)− p ≤ 0 for y ∈
[
F¯−12 (p) , F¯
−1
1 (p)
]
. In
either case, the first term is positive. Hence L1 (p) ≥ L2 (p).
Second, using a variant of the proof in Malamud and Trojani (2009), I show
that if F2 is a median-normalized spread of F1 and satisfies the single-crossing
property, then, F¯2 second order stochastically dominates F¯1. It suffices to show
that S¯2 (x)− S¯1 (x) ≥ 0 for every x.
Let y¯(F2)
ym(F2)
≥ y¯(F1)
ym(F1)
. Then S¯2 (z) − S¯1 (z) =
∫ z
0
(
F¯2 (y)− F¯1 (y)
)
dy =
45
∫ z
0
(F2 (y¯ (F2) · y)− F1 (y¯ (F2) · y)) dy. Since F2 is a median-normalized
spread of F1, F2 (ym (F2) · z) ≥ F1 (ym (F1) · z) whenever z ≤ 1. Hence
F2 (y¯ (F2) · y) ≥ F2
(
y¯(F1)
ym(F1)
y · ym (F2)
)
≥ F1 (y¯ (F1) · y) whenever y ≤ ym(F1)y¯(F1) .
Hence S¯2 (z)− S¯1 (z) ≥ 0 for z ≤ ym (F1).
By the single-crossing property, we know that there is a single z for which
F2 (y¯ (F2) · z) and F1 (y¯ (F1) · z) cross. Hence if F2 (y¯ (F2) · z) < F1 (y¯ (F1) · z)
for some z, then F2 (y¯ (F2) · y) < F1 (y¯ (F1) · y) for all y > z. This implies
that S¯2 (z) − S¯1 (z) is decreasing for z above the crossing point. Now, take
limz→∞ S¯2 (z)− S¯1 (z). Integrating by parts gives:
lim
z→∞
y [F2 (y¯ (F2) · y)− F1 (y¯ (F1) · y)]−
∫ ∞
0
y (dF2 (y¯ (F2) · y)− dF1 (y¯ (F1) · y))
= − 1
y¯ (F2)
∫ ∞
0
wdF2 (w) +
1
y¯ (F1)
∫ ∞
0
wdF1 (w)
= 0
Hence S¯2 (z) − S¯1 (z) ≥ 0 for all z, and so F¯1 second order stochastically
dominates F¯2. This completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1. Let Y2 be a median-normalized spread of Y1 and
suppose y¯(F2)
ym(F2)
= y¯(F1)
ym(F1)
. Then F2 (y¯ (F2) z) = F2
(
y¯(F1)
ym(F1)
z · ym (F2)
)
. By
median-normalized spreads, F2
(
y¯(F1)
ym(F1)
z · ym (F2)
)
≥ F1
(
y¯(F1)
ym(F1)
z · ym (F1)
)
whenever y¯(F1)
ym(F1)
z < 1, and F2
(
y¯(F1)
ym(F1)
z · ym (F2)
)
≤ F1
(
y¯(F1)
ym(F1)
z · ym (F1)
)
=
F1 (y¯ (F1) · z) whenever y¯(F1)ym(F1)z ≥ 1. Hence F2 (y¯ (F2) z) ≥ F1 (y¯ (F1) z)
whenever z < ym(F1)
y¯(F1)
and F2 (y¯ (F2) z) ≤ F1 (y¯ (F1) z) whenever z ≥ ym(F1)y¯(F1) .
Since F2 (y¯ (F2) · z∗) = 12 = F (y¯ (F1) · z∗), there is a single-crossing at
z∗ = ym(F1)
y¯(F1)
.Hence, by Lemma 3, median-normalization implies Lorenz domi-
nance.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose γ ∈ ΓL. Then, by monotonicity,
Q (g, γ) ∈ ΓL for any g ≥ 0, and so the poor will be pivotal in every period,
regardless of their choice of g. Since the dynamics of the game arise only out
of potentially changing identity of the effective median (as learning occurs),
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the game strategically collapses to one in which the poor implement their ideal
stage policy in every period. Hence, for any γ ∈ ΓL, g∗ (γ) =
(
αA
p
y
yL
) 1
1−α
and
so:
v∗θ (γ) =
1
1− δ
[
yt +
(
At − αA yt
yL
)(
αA
p
y
yL
) α
1−α
]
Now, take γ ∈ ΓH . This implies that the pivotal voter is informed and has
income yH . (To see this, note that, by construction, a coalition between the
informed rich and either the informed poor or the misinformed will command
a majority. For any two feasible policies (τ, g) ≤ (τ ′, g′) with g′ ≤ g (yL, I),
the misinformed always prefer (τ, g) to (τ ′, g′) and the informed poor always
prefer (τ ′, g′) to (τ, g). Hence, the preference of the informed rich over these
policies will be decisive.)
Let F be the set of bounded functions on Γ. Define the operator: T : F → F
by
T [v] (γ) =

maxg≥0
{(
1− pg
y
)
yH + Ag
α + δv (Q (g, γ))
}
γ ∈ ΓH
1
1−δ
[
yH + A
(
1− α y
yL
)(
αA
p
y
yL
) α
1−α
]
γ ∈ ΓL
Since v is bounded and
(
1− pg
y
)
yH+Ag
α has an upper bound (that is achieved
when g =
(
αA
p
y
yH
) 1
1−α
), it must be that T [v] is bounded.
I show that T [v] is a contraction mapping. It suffices to show that T satisfies
Blackwell's conditions. Take v, w ∈ F and suppose v (γ) ≥ w (γ) for all γ. For
γ ∈ ΓL, T [v] (γ) = T [w] [γ]. Suppose γ ∈ ΓH and let gv (γ) and gw (γ) be the
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optimal policy functions, given v and w, respectively. Then:
T [v] (γ) =
(
1− pgv (γ)
y
)
yH + A (gv (γ))
α + δv (Q (gv (γ) , γ))
≥
(
1− pgw (γ)
y
)
yH + A (gw (γ))
α + δv (Q (gw (γ) , γ))
≥
(
1− pgw (γ)
y
)
yH + A (gw (γ))
α + δw (Q (gw (γ) , γ))
= T [w] [γ]
Hence T [v] (γ) ≥ T [w] [γ], which demonstrates monotonicity. Similarly, for
γ ∈ ΓL, T [v + c] (γ) = T [v] (γ) and:
T [v + c] (γ) = max
g≥0
{(
1− pg
y
)
yH + Ag
α + δ (v (Q (g, γ)) + c)
}
= max
g≥0
{(
1− pg
y
)
yH + Ag
α + δv (Q (g, γ))
}
+ δc
= T [v] (γ) + δc
Hence T [v + c](γ) ≤ T [v] (γ) + δc, which verifies discounting. Hence, T is a
contraction mapping and so it contains a unique fixed point v∗ (γ) ∈ F .
In fact, this fixed point is the value function for a (yH , I)-type agent. It follows
that, when γ ∈ ΓH , the policy is given by:
g∗ (γ) = arg max
g≥0
(
1− pg
y
)
yH + Ag
α + δv∗ (Q (g, γ))
and the value functions for the remaining types (over the region γ ∈ ΓH) are
defined as in the statement of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4. For notational convenience, let η (g) =(
1− pg
y
)
yH +Ag
α. If the rich choose their desired stage policy g∗H = g (yH , I)
and immediately surrender political power to the poor, they will receive payoff
v¯ = η (g∗H) +
δ
1−δη (g
∗
L), where g
∗
L = g (yH , I) is the ideal policy of the poor.
Recall η is a concave function that is maximized at g∗H , and that g
∗
L > g
∗
H .
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By construction, if e ∈ EEff , then v¯ > 11−δη (0), whilst the opposite is true if
e ∈ ESS.
For each γ, define χt (γ, e) as the equilibrium informedness profile af-
ter t periods. I.e. χ1 (γ, e) = Q (g∗ (γ) , γ), and χk (γ, e) =
Q
(
g∗
(
χk−1 (γ, e)
)
, χk−1 (γ, e)
)
for each k ≥ 2. Similarly, define Gt (γ, e) as
the equilibrium level of public goods provision at time t. Clearly Gt (γ, e) =
g∗ (χt (γ, e)).
First I show that e ∈ ESS implies that the rich should never concede to the
poor. Suppose there is an equilibrium in which the rich concede power to
the poor. Let tˆ be the first period in which the poor are in power. Hence
χtˆ−1L (γ, e) ≤ 12φ < χtˆL (γ, e). At t = tˆ − 1, choosing Gtˆ−1 (γ, e) gives the rich
utility η
(
Gtˆ−1
)
+ δ
1−δη (g
∗
L). But since e ∈ ESS, 11−δη (0) > v¯ ≥ η
(
Gtˆ
)
+
δ
1−δη (g
∗
L). This implies that there is a favorable deviation for the rich to offer
g = 0 at every t ≥ tˆ − 1, and so the rich should not concede power at tˆ. But
this implies there is no first period when it is optimal for the rich to concede
power.
Next, I show that e ∈ ESS implies Gt (γ, e) → 0 for every γ ∈ ΓH . Suppose
not. Then for some ε > 0, there exists a sub-sequence {Gtk} of {Gt}, such that
Gtk ≥ ε for each k. Define the sequence {χ˜k}∞
k=0
, where χ˜0 (γ, e) = γ and for
every k ≥ 1, χ˜k (γ, e) = Q (Gtk , χ˜k−1 (γ, e)). This is the sequence of informed-
ness profiles that would arise by replacing Gt = 0 whenever Gt < ε. By mono-
tonicity, χtk (γ) ≥ χ˜k (γ). Since Q is continuous in g, there exists ρ (ε, γ) > 0
s.t. Q (g, γ)−Q (0, γ) > ρ (ε, γ) whenever g > ε. Moreover, ρ is continuous in
γ (since Q is continuous in γ). Since ΓH is compact, ρ (ε, γ) achieves its lower
bound on ΓH . Let ρ (ε) = minγ∈ΓH ρ (ε, γ). Clearly ρ (ε) > 0. Hence, for each
k, χ˜k (γ, e)− χ˜k−1 (γ, e) ≥ Q (ε, χ˜k−1 (γ, e))−Q (0, χ˜k−1 (γ, e)) > ρ (ε) > 0 
i.e. χ˜k (γ) > χ˜k−1 (γ)+ρ (ε) for every k ≥ 1. By induction, χ˜k (γ) > kρ (ε)+γ.
Then, for k >
1
2φ
−γL
ρ(ε)
= K (ε) , χtkeL (γ) ≥ χ˜keL (γ) > 12φ  i.e. for t ≥ tK(ε),
χtke (γ) ∈ ΓL; the rich will eventually surrender political power to the poor.
But this cannot be.
Next, consider an economy e ∈ EEff . This implies η (0) < η (g∗L) < η (g∗H)
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and so there exists gˆ ∈ (0, g∗H) such that 11−δη (gˆ) = η (g∗H) + δ1−δη (g∗L) = v¯.
The rich would rather concede power to the poor (and receive utility v¯) than
receive gˆ (or fewer) public goods forever into the future. Using this fact, I
show that e ∈ EEff implies the there exist T (γ, ε) < ∞ at which the rich
concede power to the poor. Suppose not. Then, for every t ≥ 1, χt (γ, e) ≤ 1
2φ
.
This requires that Gt (γ, e) → 0. (If not, using the same argument as in the
previous paragraph, we can find a sub-sequence that is bounded above zero
that guarantees that power shifts within a finite number periods.) Convergence
to zero implies that there is some Tˆ (gˆ) s.t. Gt (γ, e) < gˆ whenever t > Tˆ (gˆ).
Clearly, this policy path cannot be optimal from time Tˆ (gˆ) onwards  the rich
would be better off surrendering power to the poor at t = Tˆ (gˆ) (or sooner).
Hence, (by monotonicity) there must exist some T (γ, e) s.t. χt (γ, e) > 1
2φ
for
every t > T (γ, e).
Proof of Lemma 4 . Suppose e ∈ ESS. Suppose the objective function in
the agent's maximization problem is differentiable and concave, and so the first
order conditions are sufficient for the maximum. By the first order conditions:
η′ (Q−1 (y∗, γ))
Qg (Q−1 (y∗, γ))
+ δv′ (y∗) = 0
By the envelope theorem:
v′ (γ) = −η′ (Q−1 (y∗, γ)) Qγ (Q−1 (y∗, γ) , γ)
Qg (Q−1 (y∗, γ) , γ)
Hence, the Euler equation is:
η′ (g∗ (γ))
1
Qg (g∗, γ)
= δη′ (g∗ (y∗ (γ)))
Qγ (g
∗ (y∗ (γ)) , y∗ (γ))
Qg (g∗ (y∗ (γ)) , y∗ (γ))
where y∗ (γ) = Q (g∗ (γ) , γ). Since Qg > 0 and Qγ > 0, this implies that if
η′ (Gt (γ, e)) = 0 for some t, then η′ (Gt′ (γ, e)) = 0 for all t′ > t. If Gt (γ, e) =
g∗H for some t, then it must remain at that level indefinitely. This is impossible,
since Gt → 0. Hence, Gt (γ, e) < g∗H for all t.
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I am left to show that the objective function is indeed concave and differen-
tiable. Since the rich never concede political power, the value function satisfies:
v∗ (γ) = max
y∈[0,y¯(γ)]
{
η
(
Q−1 (y, γ)
)
+ δv∗ (y)
}
where y¯ (γ) = limg→∞ [Q (g, γ)].
I show that v∗ is concave on ΓH . Let FC be the space of bounded concave
functions. It suffices to show that T : FC → FC . Let v be a concave function.
Let γ, γ ∈ ΓH and let γλ = λγ + (1− λ) γ′. Denote y = Q (g∗ (γ) , γ), y′ =
Q (g∗ (γ′) , γ′) and yλ = Q (g∗ (γλ) , γλ). Then
T [v] (γλ) = η
(
Q−1 (yλ, γλ)
)
+ δv (yλ)
≥ η (Q−1 (λy + (1− λ) y′, λγ + (1− λ) γ′))+ δv (λy + (1− λ) y′)
≥ λη (Q−1 (y, γ))+ (1− λ) η (Q−1 (y′, γ′))+ δ [λv (y) + (1− λ) v (y′)]
= λT [v] (γ) + (1− λ)T [v] (γ′)
where the second line uses the joint concavity of η (Q−1 (y, γ)). Hence the fixed
point v∗ is concave.
Next, I show that v∗is differentiable everywhere in the interior of ΓH . Take any
γ0 ∈
(
1− 1
2φ
, 1
2φ
)
and let y∗0 = Q (g
∗ (γ0) , γ0). For γ in the neighborhood of
γ0, let ψ (γ) = η (Q
−1 (y∗0, γ))+δv
∗ (y∗0). By the optimality of v
∗, v∗ (γ) ≥ ψ (γ)
and by construction ψ (γ0) = v
∗ (γ0). Moreover, ψ (γ) is differentiable in γ,
since η and Q are differentiable. Hence, by Theorem 1 in Benveniste and
Scheinkman (1979), v∗ is differentiable at γ0. Since γ0 was chosen arbitrarily,
then v∗ is differentiable everywhere in the interior of ΓH .
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